Syria’s Security Vacuum and the Reawakening of the Islamic State
Following the Islamic State's (IS) territorial defeat in early 2019, four key stakeholders tightened their grip on the group’s remnants: the Assad regime in the West, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) supported by the international coalition in the North, Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions such as Jaish al-Ezza in the South, and the Iraqi military along with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in the east.
However, following the military victory by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) along allied factions that led to the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in early December 2024, this multilayered containment weakened, opening the door for IS to regroup and reassert itself in Syria's shifting power dynamics. The U.S.-led coalition anticipated this vulnerability through conducting dozens of precision airstrikes against IS camps in central Syria on December 8, 2024 – a clear acknowledgment that the group would exploit the security vacuum resulting from the fall of the Assad regime. HTS and Syrian opposition groups have concomitantly focused their limited manpower and resources on filling that security vacuum. Despite having far fewer troops and significantly less equipment than the Assad regime, their priority has been to maintain stability and assert control across key regions.
Yet, stabilizing the country has proven to be far from straightforward. Several external and internal actors have sought to challenge the authority of the transitional government. Since December 2024, Israel has launched a broad military campaign targeting former regime bases and long-range missile caches, citing concerns of jihadist threats. This came despite reassurances from Syria's interim President Ahmad al-Charaa since arriving in Damascus, who stated on multiple occasions: "Syria will not be a threat to any neighboring country."
Meanwhile, Druz militias in Sweida, Sahnaya, and Jaramana have refused to disarm without guarantees of political recognition and integration into the new Syrian interim government. Furthermore, on the coast, remnants of the former Assad army launched a surprise attack that killed over 300 Ministry of Defence fighters, prompting a swift and deadly retaliation that also targeted civilians. Lastly, in the north east SDF has demanded a federal structure and declined to integrate into the national government. In the south, the American-backed Free Syrian Army has cooperated with, but not officially joined, the transitional leadership.
This complex and fragmented environment has provided IS with the opportunity it needs to rebuilt the group. While government forces are preoccupied with domestic instability and power consolidation, IS has begun to infiltrate weakened areas, restock weapons caches, and reactivate sleeper cells.
Economic collapse has become a key accelerant. The transitional government is struggling to restore essential services, stabilize the Syrian pound, and create employment, particularly in areas previously held by the regime. Youth unemployment is estimated at around 75%. With no functioning welfare system, limited job opportunities, and rising prices for basic goods, public frustration is mounting.
This environment presents fertile ground for IS recruitment. The group preys on disillusioned youth, offers modest financial incentives, and leverages the prevailing insecurity and absence of state services to quietly rebuild its presence. In regions where local governance remains weak or contested, IS’s ability to mobilize and recruit is notably enhanced.
Meanwhile, IS released a statement warning President al-Charaa against joining the international anti-IS coalition and carried out several attacks. In Suwayda Province, in the South, IS conducted two separate attacks using improvised explosive devices against Ministry of Defense vehicles on May 22 and 28. The targeted vehicles belonged to U.S.-supported Free Syrian Army and 70th Division units in the al Tanf Deconfliction Zone. These attacks are the first IS-claimed attacks in southern Syria since 2023 as well as the first attacks targeting the transitional government. These incidents demonstrate that IS has likely retained attack squads in southern Syria. In Deir ez-Zor, SDF claimed to have thwarted an attempted IS attack in early May.
This map highlights the most recent locations impacted by Islamic State (IS) operations across Syria
A Strategic Resurgence?
The concentration of IS activity around Damascus suggests the group may be deliberately targeting the capital to maximize media exposure and destabilize the already fragile post-Assad security landscape. Attacks in or near the capital are likely to generate headlines, shake public confidence, and threaten the slow, painful recovery of the Syrian economy.
Increased IS activity may also aim to deter foreign investment and humanitarian efforts by reigniting fears over the country’s fragile security situation. This could have a chilling effect on refugee returns, particularly among those who have been cautiously optimistic about the country’s newfound openness.
Beyond opportunism, there is evidence to suggest a more strategic resurgence, as IS appears to be implementing a multi-phase rebuilding strategy:
1. Infiltration of ungoverned spaces: IS fighters have reportedly moved into rural and/or contested areas where the transitional government has limited reach, using tribal ties and underground networks to blend in.
2. Rebuilding logistical networks: The discovery of caches containing diverse weaponry, including heavy arms, points to the reactivation of supply chains that were once thought dismantled.
3. Propaganda revival: Online channels affiliated with IS have ramped up activity in recent months, including through recruitment calls, videos of attacks, and ideological messaging aimed at exploiting Sunni grievances.
4. Exploiting fragmentation: IS is capitalizing on rivalries between the transitional government, SDF, sectarian militias, and foreign actors. Each actor’s reluctance to cooperate creates gaps that IS can exploit for mobility, recruitment, and staging attacks.
5. Urban sabotage and intimidation: The targeting of Damascus is not just about optics. A destabilized capital will drain resources, demoralize state institutions, and invite external intervention, which IS historically thrives upon.
6. Ideological adaptation: IS has shifted from grandiose "state-building" rhetoric to a pragmatic survivalist narrative. Its messaging now emphasizes resistance against a "failed secular order" and promises basic sustenance – reflecting a strategic pivot to endure amid chaos rather than conquer territory.
The Challenge Ahead
The transitional government faces a herculean task: rebuilding state institutions, reviving public services, confronting entrenched corruption, dealing with external military threats, negotiating with SDF, and now, countering a renewed jihadist insurgency fueled by economic despair and ideological opportunism.
How Syria handles this moment will determine whether the Islamic State remains a scattered threat or once again evolves into a potent force. Without coordinated national security planning, genuine political reconciliation, and urgent economic interventions to undercut IS’s recruitment appeal, Syria risks trading one form of instability for another.
Sources:
• Le Monde, Syria’s Youth and the Temptation of Leaving, Sept. 2024.
• SITE Intelligence Group, IS Claims First Attack on Syrian Regime Forces Since HTS Takeover,
May 29, 2025 (subscription).
• Minalami, https://x.com/Minalami/status/1928194666664710261
• Naher Media, https://x.com/nahermedia/status/1927724731911811537
• Long War Journal, U.S.-Backed Syrian Free Army Continues to Patrol Tanf in Southern Syria,
Feb. 2025.
• Jihadology, The Islamic State – al-Naba Newsletter #374, Jan. 2023.
• Syrian Ministry of Interior: https://x.com/syrianmoi
